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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLEES REPLY BRIEF FAILS TO
5

EXAMINE THE PENDING ISSUES
A. Recharacterization of Claim
Appellees seek to recharacterize their causes of action to eliminate their claims for
affirmative relief. They now claim that their quiet title action sought to remove a cloud on
their title which arose when the personal representative of Malu Hoopiiaina's estate
conveyed deeds to Appellants. This mischaracterization is exposed when examining the quiet
title causes of action in Appellee's Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint (R. 127)
seeks to quiet the title in the two parcels and have that Property vested in Appellees. This
is more than removing a cloud of title. The third cause of action is for damages for wrongful
occupancy, money collected and punitive damages. The fourth cause of action is a claim for
other trust assets. Each of these causes of action seeks "affirmative relief as defined by the
Utah Supreme Court m Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P 995 (1915); Davidsen
v. Salt Lake City, 95 Utah 347, 81 P.2d 374,376 (1938); Dow v. Gilroy, 910 P.2d 1249 (Utah
App. 1996); md American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757(Utah 1992).
In this case, Appellees have asked for affirmative relief other than removal of a cloud from
their title, by asking that title be vested in their name, invalidating the conveyance of the
Property to Appellants in the probate of Malu Hoopiiaina, terminating the Lis Pendens filed
by Appellants, invalidating the existing leases on the Property, and granting Appellees
possession to the Property. (R. 132) When Appellees come to the court seeking this redress
1

against Appellants and seeking court orders to affectuate their demands, the Appellees are
seeking "affirmative relief.
When seeking "affirmative relief," the Appellees' claims are subject to the statute of
limitations. If Appellees have failed to assert their claims before the expiration of the statute
of limitations, they are not entitled to have their claims enforced by the courts. This Court
is called upon to determine the applicability of the statutes of limitation and to remand the
case to the trial court for findings of fact relating to the statutes of limitation.
Appellees assert that the principal purpose of their quiet title action was to ". . .
remove the void Personal Representatives' Deeds and Lis Pendens filed by Appellant."
Response Brief, p. 8. However, there was nothing inappropriate, negative, or sinister about
the Appellants' filing of the Lis Pendens. Under the Utah quite title statute, lis pendens can
be filed by either party:
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real
property the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the
defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed
in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder
of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of
the action or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected
thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency
against parties designated by their real names. [Emphasis added]
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1953). Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to
Appellees' Complaint and filed a lis pendens. (R. 200). Appellants' Counterclaim sought
affirmative relief by asking the court to quiet title in the Property in Appellants. Since the
2

Appellants were specifically authorized by § 78-40-2 to file a lis pendens, there can be no
implication of slander of title or any negative implication by such filing.
B. Obiter Dictum
Appellees have ignored the issue of "affirmative relief in their Response Brief.
Appellees have sought to utilize the dictum from the Court of Appeal's opinion, indicating
that the transfer of the Property to Appellants was "void and of no effect." Nolan v.
Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App 272, ^f 16. By relying on the Court of Appeals' statement,
Appellees seek to limit the scope of this Court's review, by saying that ". . . [T]he issue of
whether Plaintiffs' claims were a Quiet Title Action is now moot..." Response Brief p.5-6.
This Court's power to review the Court of Appeals' opinion cannot be limited on the basis
of dictum. The Utah Supreme Court has held in Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 934 P.2d
840, 850 (1996), " . . . language in an opinion which 'constitutes obiter dictum, [is] entirely
unnecessary for the decision of the case .. . [and has] no effect as indicating the law of the
District.'"1

1

This Court stated in Helper State Bank v. Crus, 95 Utah 320, 81 P.2d 359

(1938):
It has been held, many times, that the doctrine of the "law of the case"
does not apply to expressions of opinion on questions the determination of
which was not necessary for the decision, nor to the reasonings or illustrations
in an opinion. Thus, it is said, in Herriman Irrigation Co. v. Keel, [25 Utah
96, 69 P. 719] above cited, speaking of the "law of the case":
"It does not apply to expressions of opinions on questions the
disposition of which was not necessary for the decision, or to
reasoning or illustrations in an opinion. . . . Nothing in a
decision which is merely obiter dictum is controlled by the rule.
... But upon all questions involved in the judgment the decision
3

The Court of Appeals' statement that the transfer of the Property by the personal
representative was "void and of no effect" is entirely unnecessary for the decision and
constitutes obiter dictum. The Court of Appeals was requested to determine the
appropriateness of the summary judgment ruling entered by Judge Quinn of the Third

of the appellate court is conclusive."
Further on in the same case the court quoted from Barney v. Winona
Railroad Co., 117 U.S. 228, 6 S. Ct. 654, 29 L. Ed. 858 -Mr. Justice Field
delivering the opinion, as follows:
11

We said, however, that the grant of these additional sections
might be regarded as one of quantity,—an inadvertence for
which the writer of that opinion, who is also the writer of this
one, is alone responsible. The statement was not at all material
to the decision, which was that a deduction should have been
made by reason of the intersection of the two grants, so far as
the prior grant was located within the extension. We recognize
the rule that what was decided in a case pending before us on
appeal is not open to reconsideration in the same case, on a
second appeal upon similar facts. The first decision is the law of
the case, and must control its disposition; but the rule does not
apply to expressions of opinion on matters the disposition of
which was not required for the decision."
And in Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61 P. 999, this court
said:
11

. . . . But this rule does not apply to the argument, or to
expressions or illustrations in the argument that are obiter, and
not pertinent nor required for a disposition of the particular
question arising and decided in the case. The reasoning and
illustrations do not constitute the decision."

4

Judicial District Court. There was no cross-appeal by Appellants pending before the Court
of Appeals. The statement by the Court of Appeals that the transfer of the Property by the
personal representative was "void and of no effect" was not a necessary ruling to the issue
of the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals' ruling that the statute of limitations does
not apply to quiet title actions is the holding of the case and is the basis for this appeal
The appeal process is very strict about the questions that will be entertained on
appeal. These questions must be raised in the Notice of Appeal or the docketing statement.
This court, in Herriman Irrigation Company v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719, 721 (1902),
stated:
"On appeal, all questions to be determined must be raised by assignments of
error, and in the appellate court only questions so raised can be presented and
determined. . . . Before the appellate court can review the action of the trial
court to determine a question such question must be raised by an assignment
of error
It is a general rule of practice in this court that all errors assigned,
but not insisted upon in the appellant's brief, will be disregarded, and
considered as waived and as raising no question for determination. Only such
questions, therefore,... as are raised by assignment of error, and presented in
the appellant's brief, are before the supreme court for determination."
The Court of Appeals' decision goes beyond the stated issues pending on appeal. In
Appellees' Docketing Statement, they list the issues pending on appeal as follows:
1.
Whether the Court erred by granting Summary Judgment in favor
of Defendants where there were genuine issues of material fact as to when
Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the existence of the two Trusts.
2.
Whether the District Court erred in determining that the statute
of limitations had expired on Plaintiffs' Complaint by reason of Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-1006 or § 78-12-25(3)(3 year statute of imitations) or § 78-12-25
(4 year statute of limitations), and whether the District Court erred in applying
the "Discovery Rule" relating to when Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the
Trusts and whether Defendants had concealed Plaintiffs' cause of action.
5

Appellees' Brief to the Court of Appeals never requested a finding that the personal
representatives' deeds were null and void, that the Trusts were valid, that the Appellees were
the owners of the Property, or whether Malu repudiated or breached the trust. None of these
opinions were necessary for the Court of Appeals' decision and therefore, are dictum and are
not binding on this Court or the trial court upon remand.
C Stale Claim
Appellees assert that the Appellants' deed and possession of the Property constitutes
a "stale claim." This characterization, however, is inappropriate. It is Appellees whose
claim is stale. A stale claim is defined as follows:
A demand or claim that has long remained unasserted, one that is first asserted
after an unexplained delay which is so long as to render it difficult or
impossible for the court to ascertain the truth of the matters in controversy and
do justice between the parties or as to create a presumption against the
existence or the validity of the claim, or a presumption that the claim has been
abandoned or satisfied. [Authority Omitted] . . . It implies a greater lapse of
time than is necessary to "laches." [Authority Omitted] . . . The doctrine is
purely an equitable one, and arises only when, from lapse of time and laches
of Plaintiff, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
[Authority Omitted].
H. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, (1968), p. 1575-6. Appellees seek to utilize their
mischaracterized classification of "stale claim" as a basis for the argument that the statute
of limitation should not apply to quiet title actions because it ". . . would render property
unmarketable if the apparent or stale claims could not be removed." Response Brief, p.6.
Appellees make this comment without authority. However, the Court in Branting refutes
these bare allegations which seek to undermine the applicability of the statute of limitations:

6

. . . If it be held that this is merely an action to remove a cloud from the title
or to quiet the title to real estate, then respondent's counsel have found an easy
way to avoid the plea of the statute of limitations as to all actions in which the
plaintiffs real estate or some lien thereon may either directly or indirectly be
involved. In other words, every kind or character of affirmative relief may be
prayed for and obtained by a plaintiff or counterclaimant if such relief in some
way affects his rights in or title to his real estate. There can be no doubt that
this action was commenced for the purpose of invoking the aid of a court of
equity to declare certain proceedings whereby a certain tax was assessed and
levied against respondent's properly void and of no effect and to annul said
proceedings. . . .
Now, it must seem clear, to all who have given or will give the matter
any consideration whatever, that if section 2883 [Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25]
be denied application to a case like the one at bar, then the statute is practically
repealed. That section applies to all actions for relief that is not otherwise
covered by any other section. Where therefore affirmative relief is sought, as
in this case, that section applies with full force. If that were not so, then all
actions wherein it is sought to set aside any proceedings, judicial or otherwise,
or any judgment of any court which may be a lien upon real property, may be
prosecuted regardless of any statute of limitations. Although the respondent
has, as a part of his prayer, asked to have removed the so-called cloud from his
title, yet, as we have seen, the action was brought to annul certain proceedings,

Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296 153 P. 995, 1000 (1915). Plaintiffs cannot avoid
the statute of limitations by simply claiming that they are not seeking affirmative relief.
There can be no doubt that Appellees initiated this action to have the court declare the
personal representatives' deeds invalid, to change possession of the Property, and to issue
deeds or orders vesting title of the Property in Appellees. These are each "affirmative relief
Appellees seek from the courts. Such affirmative relief requires the imposition of the statute
of limitations.

7

D. Applicability of "Affirmative Relief9 Cases
Appellees' position is that"... [t]he cases set forth by Appellants in their argument
had no precedential relevance to the action before the court

All other cases set forth by

Appellants have no relevance to the statute of limitations on quiet title actions." Brief of
Respondents, p.9. Appellees dismiss the precedent set forth in Branting, Davidsen, Dow,
and American Tiara and ignore the "affirmative relief standard. The "affirmative relief
standard is the measure established by the Supreme Court to determine whether the statute
of limitations applies in quiet title actions. To ignore this standard denies the Appellants the
measured consistency of Utah Supreme Court rulings. It appears in this case that the Court
of Appeals exceeded the scope of its task and rather than simply focusing on the issues
pending on appeal, the appropriateness of the summary judgment entered by Judge Quinn
in the Third District Court, sought to resolve legal issues and make a determination that
would dispose of the entire case. Rather than address the issues of the statutes of limitations
which was the basis of the trial court's summary judgment, the Court of Appeals negated the
statutes of limitations issues and addressed legal issues not briefed or presented to then. In
this appeal, Appellees have assumed a position similar to the Court of Appeals', ignoring the
statute of limitations and seeking to limit the scope of this appeal by claiming that opinions
expressed by the Court of Appeals in dictum constitute the law of the case. Appellees have
failed to distinguish the cases establishing "affirmative relief as the trigger for the statute
of limitations. Appellees seem to assert that since the "principle purpose" of their actions
was not to obtain some "affirmative relief," and therefore "affirmative relief" standard is

8

inapplicable.

However, Appellees' discussion of the causes of action asserted in their

Amended Complaint verify and reinforce that Appellees' purpose in bringing the action was
not simply to remove a cloud against the title of the Property, but was to change the
possession and title owner of the Property.

Appellees' desire for an accounting of

Appellants' receipt and disbursement of income from the Property constitutes "affirmative
relief." Likewise, the return of personal property, or payment of its value, is affirmative
relief, not simply "seeking to avoid apparent or stale claims." Appellees' claims have always
sought the intervention of the court, on their behalf, to validate their claim to the Property,
to grant them possession, to give them an accounting, and to return or pay for personal
property. Every one of these claims seeks "affirmative relief from the courts. It is clear that
the principle purpose for the Appellees' action was for "affirmative relief." The cases cited
by Appellants are binding on the adjudication of these issues and the statutes of limitation
apply.
E. Presumption of Application of Statute of Limitations
Based on the statutes of limitation and case law, there appears to be a presumption
that the statute of limitations applies to all actions in the state of Utah. By its terms, Utah
Code Ann. §78-12-25(3) states that "an action may be brought within four years for relief
not otherwise provided by law." The negative implication of this statute is that if any action
which is not specifically provided for in another statute of limitations, is brought more than
four years after the cause of action accrues, the action is barred by §78-12-25(3). The

9

presumption that the statute of limitations applies all cases is further supported by this
Court's holding in American Tierra:
Having concluded that the subdivides' claims are equitable and not
barred for failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, we
must determine whether they are nonetheless barred by a statute of limitation.
Historically, courts of equity were not bound by statutes of limitation. See,
e.g., Patterson v. Hewitt, 49 L. Ed. 214, 195 U.S. 309, 317, 25 S.Ct. 35
(1904). Today, however, many jurisdictions have commingled legal and
equitable remedies in one form of action. In these jurisdictions, "the
applicability of statutes of limitation to equitable proceedings appears to be
unquestioned." 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 157 , at 693 (1966). Utah is one of
those jurisdictions that long ago commingled legal and equitable actions. See
Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (citing Utah R. Civ. P.
2). Moreover, years before Utah merged its legal and equitable systems, Utah
applied statutes of limitation to equitable actions. See, e.g., Fullerton v. Bailey,
53 P. 1020, 17 Utah 85 (1898). We therefore must determine which statute of
limitation applies to this action.
Frequently, actions in equity are held to come within the scope of the
statutory provision that establishes a time limit applicable to all causes of
action for which a specific limit is not otherwise provided. 27 Am. Jur. 2d
Equity §157 , at 693 (1966). Utah's catch-all provision places a four-year
limitation period on actions "not otherwise provided for by law." Utah Code
Ann. §78-12-25(3).
This court previously has applied the predecessor of §78-12-25(3) to
equitable actions. For instance, in Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296,
153 P. 995 (Utah 1915), the plaintiff brought an equitable action seeking
nullification of a municipal ordinance that ordered the construction of a sewer
and the assessment of a special tax on abutting property. 153 P. at 996. As
a defense, the city interposed section 2833 of the Compiled Laws of 1907,
which required, "An action for relief not herein before provided for must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued."
153 P. at 1000. We concluded that section 2833 applied to all actions, both
legal and equitable, in which affirmative relief is sought. Because more than
four years had elapsed since the claim accrued, the catch-all provision barred
the claim. See 153 P. at 1001; accord Fullerton v. Bailey, 17 Utah at 93.
Again, in Brown v. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 P.2d 881 (Utah 1937), we applied
Utah's four-year catch-all statute of limitation to preclude a claim for an
equitable lien. 70 P.2d at 885. Before applying the catch-all statute to this
10

case, however, we must satisfy ourselves that Utah's current statutes of
limitation do not contain a more specific provision that should cover the
instant case.
American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757,760 (1992). It appears that this
Court and the Utah statutes presume that the statutes of limitations are applicable in all
actions brought before Utah courts. In the case of quiet title actions, there is an exception
when the plaintiff seeks only to clear an apparent or stale claim where no affirmative relief
is sought.
Since the Appellees in this case are seeking "affirmative relief," the statute of
limitations is applicable to determine the timeliness of Appellees' filing of their quiet title
actions. The Appellees therefore have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
statute of limitations applies to their claim by demonstrating that they do not seek
"affirmative relief."
POINT II
CERTIORARI WAS GRANTED ON THE ISSUE OF
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, INCLUDING ITS
APPLICABILITY TO THE TRUST
Appellees have assert that the Writ of Certiorari granted by this Court does not extend
to the issue of an irrevocable trust who breaches his trust. Appellants have briefed the
applicability of the statute of limitations to the breaching trustee believing that the statute of
limitations applies as part of the quiet title action. There is no separate cause of action
relating to the trustee's breach and repudiation of the irrevocable trust. Appellees assert two
causes of action for quiet title. The Court of Appeals found that the Appellees ". . . were
primarily seeking to remove the cloud of Cuma's deed of the real property . . .." Nolan v.
11

Hoopiiaina, 2005 UT App. 272, ]fl9. To Appellants, this action is a quiet title action.
Quieting title in Appellees was a condition precedent for the pursuit and effectuation of the
other causes of action. There is no separate cause of action relating to the trustee's breach
and the trustee's breach arises incidental to the quiet title claim. On this basis, Appellants
believe that the applicability of the statute of limitations to a trustee breaching his irrevocable
trust is part and parcel of the overriding quiet title action. Therefore, Appellant briefs the
statute of limitations issue as it applies to a breaching trustee of an irrevocable trust.
Appellees have chosen not to address this issue in their reply brief Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the trustee "had no power to revoke the trusts and deal
with the trusts' assets as provided in the trust instruments," Nolan, at ^[15, is legally
unsustainable because it fails to recognize the well-established doctrines of repudiation and
breach of the trust by the trustee. When the quiet title claim of the beneficiaries is against
third parties, not members of the trust, then the statute of limitations is applicable to the quiet
title action. Jenkins v Jenkins, 24 Utah 108, 66 P.773, 778 (1901) ("the rule that the statute
of limitations does not bar a trust estate holds only between cestui que trust and trustee, not
between cestui que trust on one side, and strangers on the other; for that would make the
statute [of limitations] of no force at all . . . ."). The Court of Appeals decision ignores
Appellant's assertion of repudiation and breach of irrevocable trust which directly affects the
Appellant's rights in the quiet title action. If Malu's breach of the irrevocable trusts occurred
with the knowledge of the Trustees, the Appellees' quiet title action may be barred.
Appellees have not had the opportunity to develop the factual issues relating to repudiation
12

and breach of trust and as defenses to Appellees' quiet title action. The Appellants should
be able to assert repudiation and breach of the trust agreement as defenses in any further
proceedings of this case.
CONCLUSION
Appellees' response brief is based on avoidance and denial.

This Court has

established the "affirmative relief standard to determine whether the statute of limitations
applies in quiet title actions.

Appellees' Complaint and Amended Complaint seek

"affirmative relief in every cause of action asserted. The Appellees seek to have the courts
invalidate the personal representatives' deeds conveying the property to Appellants, vest the
title of the property in Appellees, grant possession of the property to Appellees, invalidate
the leases on the Property, receive an accounting from Appellants of income and
distributions relating to the Property, and account for trust property or its equivalent value.
These remedies each constitute "affirmative relief and require affirmative orders and action
form the courts. In this case, the Supreme Court is not limited in its decision by the dictum
of the Court of Appeals. The "affirmative relief standard established by this Court in
Branting is still the measure of whether the statute of limitations is applicable in quiet title
actions. Because the Appellees seek "affirmative relief," the statute of limitations is
applicable. In this quiet title action, the statute of limitations is also applicable to the
trustee's repudiation and breach of an irrevocable trust. This Court should remand this quiet
title action case to the trial court mandating the applicability of the statute of limitations.

13
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